Apache Axis CVE-2026-90436 Hits CISA KEV: Exploited in Confluence Data Center and N-able N-central

Introduction

CVE-2026-90436 is an unauthenticated unsafe-reflection RCE (CVSS 9.8) in Apache Axis 1.x, a SOAP library that reached end of life years ago. It still ships inside commercial products, and attackers are now using it against two of them. Rapid7 caught a hands-on intrusion through Atlassian Confluence Data Center, and the N-able N-central "4EverAble2Shell" chain was used to plant cryptominers on MSP servers within hours of a public PoC. CISA added the CVE to KEV on November 18 with a November 21 deadline. Upgrade Confluence to 9.2.28 or 10.x and N-central to 2026.4 HF3, and turn off the legacy SOAP endpoints now.

What Happened

Axis 1.x (through 1.4) processes certain SOAP messages before service-level authentication runs, and uses attacker-influenced input to choose which classes to load (CWE-470). Apache disclosed the issue on November 6. Because 1.x is end of life, no fixed 1.x release is coming. Apache's advice is to migrate to Axis2/Java or rebuild with its source patch.

Date (2026) Event
Nov 6 Apache discloses CVE-2026-90436
Nov 12 Researcher Sean Bales publishes 4EverAble2Shell and Agent2Shell PoCs for N-central; exploitation starts the same morning
Nov 13 Rapid7 MDR detects exploitation of a Confluence Data Center customer; N-able confirms N-central exploitation
Nov 16 N-able releases N-central 2026.4 HF3 (2026.4.1.39)
Nov 17 Metasploit module released
Nov 18 CISA adds CVE-2026-90436 to KEV, due Nov 21

Confluence intrusion. Rapid7 saw unauthenticated POSTs to /plugins/servlet/soap-axis1/confluenceservice-v2 return HTTP 500. Within seconds, Confluence's Java process was spawning bash and curl. The attacker ran hundreds of hex-encoded commands pulled from temporary tunnel domains, and Rapid7 suggests the tooling was AI-assisted. The attacker then:

  • dumped Confluence config, encryption keys and DB settings, and queried page bodies and attachments directly in MySQL
  • scraped the attachments store for credentials, VPN configs, private keys and Luhn-valid card numbers
  • used a Confluence credential against the Crowd API and tried AS-REP roasting against a domain controller (both failed)
  • about 4 hours in, queried a production cloud data warehouse with a service account
  • about 12 hours in, signed in to Microsoft 365 as an integration service account using legacy authentication

N-central 4EverAble2Shell. The chain pairs CVE-2026-90436 with a separate N-central local privilege escalation (tracked by Previdian as VULN-2026-0009, no CVE) to get unauthenticated root on servers with the Legacy API enabled. Huntback counted 21 servers running XMRig miners by 12:50 UTC on November 12. 19 of those 21 were on the then-latest 2026.4.1.26 HF2.

Why It Matters

Both victims are high-value hubs. Confluence is where teams paste credentials, runbooks, network diagrams and API keys, and Rapid7's case shows an attacker using it to reach the domain, the data warehouse and Microsoft 365 within a day. N-central is an RMM: root on the server means the ability to push scripts to every managed endpoint of every MSP customer. Mining is the mild outcome. The same access would deliver ransomware just as easily.

The deeper problem is the dependency. Axis 1.x is a dead library sitting inside products you may not think of as "Java SOAP apps", and scanners that only read manifests will not see it.

Who Is Affected

  • Apache Axis 1.x through 1.4, in any product that embeds it. There is no upstream fix.
  • Atlassian Confluence Data Center / Server 1.x through 9.x, only when Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP) is enabled. It has been off by default for new installs since 3.0, but older instances and integrations often turned it on. Fixed in 9.2.28. 10.x removed the feature. Atlassian Cloud is not affected.
  • N-able N-central on-premises with Legacy API enabled, including 2026.4 HF2. HF3 (2026.4.1.39) disables Legacy API. N-able applied temporary protections to hosted environments.
  • Other vendors' products that bundle Axis 1.x. Check vendor advisories and the inventory step below.

How to Protect Yourself

1. Confluence: patch or switch off the Remote API

Upgrade to 9.2.28 or a current 10.x. Until then, go to General Configuration → Further Configuration, clear Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP) and save. No restart is needed, though integrations that use the API will break.

2. N-central: go to HF3 and confirm Legacy API is off

Upgrade to 2026.4 HF3 (2026.4.1.39) on an emergency basis, verify that Legacy API is disabled even if you were already on HF2, and follow N-able's Agent and Probe upgrade guidance.

3. Find Axis 1.x elsewhere

# jars on disk
find / -xdev \( -iname 'axis-1*.jar' -o -iname 'axis.jar' \) 2>/dev/null
# inside fat jars / wars
find / -xdev \( -name '*.war' -o -name '*.jar' \) -size +1M 2>/dev/null \
  | xargs -r -I{} sh -c 'unzip -l "{}" 2>/dev/null | grep -q "org/apache/axis/" && echo "{}"'

4. Hunt Confluence access logs and processes

# unauthenticated SOAP hits, especially 500s
sudo zgrep -h 'soap-axis1' /opt/atlassian/confluence/logs/conf_access_log*.log* 2>/dev/null | grep -E '" 500 |POST'

# Confluence JVM spawning shells or downloaders
ps -eo pid,ppid,user,cmd --forest | grep -A2 '[c]onfluence' | grep -E 'bash|sh -c|curl|wget|python'

5. Check for the published IOCs

From Rapid7. Use them for hunting, and remember that finding nothing does not prove the host is clean:

IOCS='192\.238\.253\.176|5\.133\.47\.243|163\.182\.68\.109|104\.13\.106\.166|157\.20\.241\.16|139\.99\.69\.109|79\.76\.51\.56|trycloudflare\.com|free\.pinggy\.net|webhook\.site'
sudo zgrep -hEi "$IOCS" /var/log/nginx/*.log* /var/log/apache2/*.log* /opt/atlassian/confluence/logs/*.log* 2>/dev/null | head

# N-central miner artifacts (Previdian/Huntback)
systemctl list-unit-files | grep -i xvd
ls -la /tmp/.xvd /var/tmp/.xvd 2>/dev/null
ps -eo pid,user,pcpu,cmd --sort=-pcpu | head -5

Also look for requests to /dms/services/ServerUI that reference jline.internal.TerminalLineSettings on N-central.

6. If you were hit, assume credential theft

Rotate the Confluence database password, its application-link and integration tokens, and anything stored in pages or attachments. Review Microsoft 365 sign-ins for integration service accounts and block legacy authentication. On N-central, assume the attacker could push scripts to managed devices: audit recent automation policies and scripts, and reimage the server.

Source