Puppet Enterprise CVE-2026-115731: Exploited Report Deserialization RCE Can Leak Your CA Signing Key

Introduction

CISA added CVE-2026-115731, a CVSS 9.4 deserialization flaw in how Puppet Enterprise and Puppet Core process agent reports, to the KEV catalog on November 17. Federal agencies have until December 1 to fix it. Any client holding a certificate signed by the Puppet CA can submit a crafted report and run code on the server. Perforce warns this can expose the CA signing key, and anyone holding that key controls what every managed node runs on its next Puppet run. Patch to Puppet Enterprise 2026.0.1, 2025.12.1 or 2023.8.13, or Puppet Core 9.1.3 / 8.22.2, and turn off naive autosigning today.

What Happened

Perforce patched the bug on November 3, 2026, together with CVE-2026-115732, a critical certificate-name issue that lets a certificate whose name extends an approved name impersonate a managed machine. Both are covered in Perforce's advisory "Puppet security vulnerabilities CVE-2026-115731 and CVE-2026-115732."

The timeline since then:

  • November 3: Fixes released for Puppet Enterprise, Puppet Enterprise Advanced and Puppet Core.
  • November 4: A comment in the r/Puppet community flagged the bug as exploited.
  • Shortly after the patch: A public proof-of-concept appeared targeting OpenVox, the community fork of Puppet, which shares the vulnerable code.
  • November 17: CISA added CVE-2026-115731 to KEV, due December 1 under BOD 26-04.

The vulnerable code is in server-side report processing. Agents send a report after every run, and the server deserializes it without restricting what it will instantiate. The resulting code runs as the Puppet server service user, the same account that can read the CA material on a primary server.

The attacker needs a signed agent certificate. That is a low bar in practice. An attacker who already owns any managed node has one, and on servers that autosign certificate requests without strong checks, an unauthenticated attacker can simply request one.

Why It Matters

Configuration management is the closest thing most infrastructure has to a master key. A Puppet primary decides what packages, users, SSH keys, sudoers rules and services exist on every node it manages. If the CA key leaks, an attacker can mint certificates for any node name, impersonate the server, and push their own catalog fleet-wide. That turns one compromised web server with a Puppet agent into a supply-chain compromise of the whole estate.

It is also a pivot path that defenders tend to overlook. The usual hardening effort goes into protecting the Puppet server from the internet. Here, the input arrives from a node you already manage, over the channel you deliberately left open.

Who Is Affected

  • Puppet Enterprise and Puppet Enterprise Advanced before 2026.0.1, 2025.12.1 and 2023.8.13.
  • Puppet Core (open source) before 9.1.3 and 8.22.2.
  • OpenVox server deployments. The public PoC targets OpenVox, so check the OpenVox project for fixed releases.
  • Highest risk: servers that use autosign = true or a permissive autosign.conf glob, and any environment where an agent node is already compromised.
  • Compile servers and the CA server alike, because both process reports. The CA server is where key exposure becomes catastrophic.

How to Protect Yourself

1. Check the version on every primary and compiler

puppetserver --version
puppet --version
# Puppet Enterprise
cat /opt/puppetlabs/server/pe_version 2>/dev/null

2. Upgrade

Puppet Enterprise: upgrade to 2026.0.1, 2025.12.1 or 2023.8.13 using the PE installer for your track, primary first, then compilers. Puppet Core / open source:

# Debian / Ubuntu
sudo apt update && sudo apt install --only-upgrade puppetserver puppet-agent
# RHEL family
sudo dnf upgrade puppetserver puppet-agent
sudo systemctl restart puppetserver

3. Kill permissive autosigning now

This is the vendor's main workaround and is worth doing even after patching:

puppet config print autosign --section server
cat "$(puppet config print confdir)/autosign.conf" 2>/dev/null

# disable autosign until you have a policy-based or manual process
puppet config set autosign false --section server
sudo systemctl restart puppetserver

If you need automated enrollment, use policy-based autosigning that checks a pre-shared challenge password or a cloud instance identity document, not a hostname glob.

4. Audit what the CA has signed

Look for certificates you did not expect, especially recent ones and names that extend legitimate hostnames, which is the CVE-2026-115732 pattern:

puppetserver ca list --all | sort
# certificates issued since the patch date
find "$(puppet config print cadir)/signed" -name '*.pem' -newermt '2026-11-03' -printf '%TY-%Tm-%Td %f\n' 2>/dev/null | sort

Revoke anything unknown with puppetserver ca revoke --certname <name>.

5. Hunt the server for code execution

The payload runs as the Puppet server service user, usually puppet or pe-puppet, so look for that user doing things it never does:

ps -eo pid,ppid,user,cmd --forest | grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ +[0-9]+ +(pe-)?puppet ' | grep -E 'sh -c|bash|curl|wget|python|nc '

sudo ausearch -ua "$(id -u pe-puppet 2>/dev/null || id -u puppet)" -sc execve -ts 11/03/2026 -i 2>/dev/null | grep proctitle

# report processing errors around unusual reports
sudo grep -hiE 'report|deserializ' /var/log/puppetlabs/puppetserver/puppetserver.log* | grep -iE 'error|exception' | tail -50

6. If the CA server was compromised, rebuild trust

Patching does not undo a leaked CA key. If you find evidence of code execution on the CA host, treat the CA as burned. Regenerate the CA, re-issue agent certificates, review every catalog and Hiera change for tampering, and rotate secrets that Puppet distributes, such as SSH keys and service passwords. Perforce describes the key exposure risk explicitly, so don't skip this step on the grounds that nobody can prove the key was read.

Source